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BRIDGING THE GREAT DIVIDE-A RESPONSE
TO LINDA GREENHOUSE AND REVA B. SIEGEL'S
BEFORE (AND AFTER) ROE V. WADE:
NEW QUESTIONS ABOUT BACKLASH
LOLITA BUCKNER INNISS*
ABSTRACT
This essay discusses the history of Roe v. Wade as recently addressed
by Linda Greenhouse and Reva B. Siegel. Going beyond their assertions, I
suggest that an additional, more encompassing inquiry focuses on what
factors are implicated in the politics of abortion and how these factors
relate to larger social, political, and cultural conflicts both before and
after Roe. By naming party politics and the Catholic Church, Greenhouse
and Siegel posit two crucial elements that shaped the abortion debate. I
assert, however, that what is not discussed in their Article is the way
numerous other factors have figured into the debate, race and class being
two of the most salient. Race, class, and abortion have interacted in
complex and numerous ways throughout United States history. While this
interaction in some respects can be described via a linear, historical
approach, it is not fully explicated by a single dichotomous before/after
analysis centered on Roe. Instead, race, class, and abortion are constantly
interacting, sometimes co-constructed, constituent parts of a much greater
social, cultural, and political conversation in the United States. I suggest
that if national party politics and the Catholic Church are important
aspects of the development of the United States narrative on abortion, then
race and class are telling and even compelling subtexts in that narrative.
Giving attention to these subtextual strands may offer valuable additional
insights.
* Lolita Buckner Inniss is the Joseph C. Hostetler-Baker and Hostetler Professor of Law at
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. A.B., Princeton University; J.D.,
University of California, Los Angeles; LL.M., Ph.D., Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
linnisscsu a gmail.com. The author thanks Professor April Cherry for her comments on an earlier draft
of this essay.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I agree with Linda Greenhouse and Reva B. Siegel's assertion that
identifying Roe v. Wade' as the inchoative point of the abortion debate
trajectory misapprehends the full scope and nature of the debate and
2
unduly focuses on judicial actors. However, the before and after model
that they embrace is perhaps not the most efficacious way of diagramming
what has occurred in relation to abortion politics in the United States. The
question is not only, I suggest, what happened before or after Roe. A more
encompassing inquiry focuses on what factors are imbricated in the
politics of abortion and how these factors relate to larger social, political,
and cultural conflicts both before and after Roe. Two significant factors in
the bigger picture are race and class.
It is true that Roe has become generally synonymous with political
conflict.3 It is also true that Roe is frequently cited as the source of
political polarization over abortion and therefore functions as the "great
divide" in addressing the social and political tenor of women's
reproductive rights in the United States.4 Thus, one of the most frequently
occurring themes in discussing legal access to abortion is the dichotomy
between conditions before abortion was made available throughout the
United States via Roe and conditions after the ruling.5 Because before and
after themes often signal the ameliorative or pejorative dimensions of a
process or cause and effect, this type of thematic address primes the reader
for a linear, temporal account of change. Greenhouse and Siegel adopt
such a theme in their recent Article. In doing so, however, they seek to de-
center Roe, contending that partisan politics before Roe, and not
disagreement with the Supreme Court's decision after Roe, is significantly
responsible for the contemporary backlash against abortion.6 They offer a
political and historical account of what is frequently expressed in legal
terms, explaining that the legal ruling in Roe was not the catalyst of the
social and political storm surrounding abortion. Instead, Greenhouse and
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About
Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028 (2011).
3. Id. at 2030.
4. Id.
5. As one writer observes, seventeen states had legalized or decriminalized abortion before Roe
v. Wade; the Court's decision in Roe barred state statutes that universally banned abortion. LINDA
GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA
300 (2002).
6. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 2, at 2031.
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Siegel aver, the decision in Roe is part of the broader conflict over
abortion that existed before Roe was decided.
At the heart of Greenhouse and Siegel's argument is the claim that in
the years immediately before Roe, strategists for the Republican Party
encouraged President Nixon to attack abortion and to articulate anti-
abortion positions.8 The purpose of the attack was in order to draw
Catholic voters away from their traditional Democratic alliances.
Republican embrace of anti-abortion stances was a method of attracting
social conservatives, especially Catholics, who eschewed "radical" groups
and policies supported by Democratic candidates. 9 Greenhouse and Siegel,
as they make clear in their Article, do not urge that the Supreme Court's
decision in Roe played no role in the abortion conflict.10 Rather, they
assert that pre-Roe abortion conflicts, and the resulting shifting alignments
of political actors, are important keys to understanding the United States
abortion debate." Hence, write Greenhouse and Siegel, these matters and
related issues in the period before Roe are worthy of further scholarly
- 12
examination.
By naming party politics and the Catholic Church, the authors posit
two crucial elements that shaped the abortion debate. However, what is not
discussed in their Article is the way that numerous other factors have
figured into the debate, race and class being two of the most salient. Race,
class, and abortion have interacted in complex and numerous ways
throughout United States history. While this interaction in some respects
can be described via a linear, historical approach, it is not fully explicated
by a single dichotomous before/after analysis centered on Roe. Instead,
race, class, and abortion are constantly interacting, sometimes co-
constructed, constituent parts of a much greater social, cultural, and
political conversation in the United States.
In the Article, the authors propound their arguments in three parts. In
Part I of their Article, they consider four claims and frames that shape the
way in which abortion was discussed before Roe: public health, concerns
for the environment and population, sexual freedom, and finally feminist
voices.13 In Part II, the authors describe how abortion politics became a
part of a political strategy as Republicans, who had often been among the
7. Id. at 2030-31.
8. Id. at 2031,2052-59.
9. Id. at 2052.
10. Id. at 2086.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2034-45.
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supporters of abortion liberalization before Roe, began to articulate anti-
abortion points of view. 14 This shift, they explain, was largely in order to
attract socially conservative and/or religious voters away from the
Democratic Party.'5 Finally, in Part III of the Article, the authors survey
popular and academic commentary that position the Roe case as the legal
and political polestar of the debate on abortion. 16 I suggest that if national
party politics and the Catholic Church are important aspects of the
development of the United States narrative on abortion, then race and class
are telling and even compelling subtexts in that narrative. Giving attention
to these subtextual strands may offer valuable additional insights.
II. THE DISCOURSE OF ABORTION
In Part I of their Article, the authors point out that although most
contemporary meanings of abortion center on Roe, the discursive import
of abortion changed in structure, meaning, and intensity well prior to Roe.
While this is in some senses a discussion of a sociohistoric rhetorical
phenomenon, it is well more than a rhetorical concern. These multiple
discursive frames-public health, environmental and population concerns,
sexual freedom, and feminist voices-each entertaining a particular
construction of abortion, are all part of a larger social and cultural program
underwritten by issues of race and class.
For instance, in discussiong the history of abortion Greenhouse and
Siegel indicate that abortion was widely permitted in the United States
prior to 1821 if performed before quickening.17 They identify an 1821
Connecticut law as the first state statute criminalizing abortion.18 The 1821
Connecticut statute is often said to mark the beginning of legal bars on
abortion. Abortion was in fact permitted even under the 1821 Connecticut
statute if performed before quickening and done by mechanical means; the
statute was in many respects a codification of existing United States legal
norms and criminalized only post-quickening abortion via "deadly poison,
or any noxious or destructive substance" that was administered "to cause
14. Id. at 2046-70.
15. Id. at 2056.
16. Id. at 2071-85.
17. Id. at 2034.
18. Id. Though the 1821 Connecticut statute represents the first explicit state criminalization of
post-quickening abortion, between 1821 and 1841 ten states passed laws that criminalized abortions,
chiefly by making providers of abortifacients and mechanical abortion procedures subject to
prosecution and criminal penalties. ANDREA TONE, CONTROLLING REPRODUCTION, AN AMERICAN
HISTORY 138 (1996).
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or procure a miscarriage."' 9 Gradually, Greenhouse and Siegel indicate,
other states enacted bans on abortion, leading to nation-wide prohibitions
by the turn of the nineteenth-century.20
There is, however, a back-story to this commonly offered legal history
of abortion in the United States, and this back-story that raises issues of
race and class. It has been suggested that the move by many states to
legislatively bar abortion was associated with the beginning of the "penny
press" era in which the availability of abortion was promulgated via
- * *21
advertisements in mass media publications popular among the poor.
Prior to this period, states had not necessarily perceived abortion as a
significant problem, and thus states often practiced a policy of abortion
"containment" in lieu of active enforcement efforts.22 Moreover, in
looking at the historic overview that Greenhouse and Siegel offer, it is
noteworthy that the move towards criminalizing abortion, beginning in the
1820s, heightening after the Civil War, and culminating at the end of the
nineteenth-century with widespread bans on abortion, also coincided with
significant conflicts over slavery, leading up to the Civil War and black
freedom. This time period also heralded a large-scale growth in the
number of poor people in the United States, with much of this expansion
attributable to immigration and the general emancipation of blacks. The
coincidence of heightened abortion bars and the increase in numbers of
free blacks and poor people is not to suggest that concerns about blacks or
poor people were necessarily at the center of, either ideologically or
materially, the nineteenth-century abortion debate. Nonetheless, it is
interesting to note that the antebellum conflict over black slavery and the
impact of Dred Scott v. Sandford, differently contextualized, is becoming
19. See JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
POLICY, 1800-1900 21 (1978). It may be useful to examine more closely the history of the
Connecticut statute and other state statutes in much the same way that Greenhouse and Siegel consider
the pre-history of Roe. According to one writer, the Connecticut statute was adopted in almost direct
response to a scandalous case that took place in Connecticut in 1818 involving a minister who was
convicted of impregnating a young woman to whom he was not married and then giving her an
abortion-inducing substance. MARVIN N. OLASKY, ABORTION RITES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
ABORTION IN AMERICA 92 93 (1992); see also KAREN ERDEVIG GEDGE, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF
CLERGY: WOMEN AND THE PASTORAL RELATIONSHIP IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN CULTURE
57 (2003). For an account of the case by the convicted minister, see AMMI ROGERS, MEMOIRS OF THE
REV. AMMI ROGERS, A.M. (1834). Rogers asserts in his memoirs that the accuser later recanted.
Rogers also argued that the case was part of a political and religious plot to discredit him. Id. at 5-6.
For a brief mention of Ammi Rogers and his memoirs, see William Renwick Riddell, Common Law
and Common Sense, 27 YALE L.J. 993, 998 (1918).
20. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 2, at 2034.
21. OLASKY, supra note 19, at 94.
22. Id.
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a metaphor of choice for some contemporary anti-abortion activists.2 3
However, the occurrence of large-scale racial and class upheaval and
associated concerns about the "moral decay" of society, contemporaneous
with a sharp rise in anti-abortion sentiment, bears some investigation.
Race and class are infused throughout other discursive frames that the
authors identify as well. For instance, the authors assert that the
professional medical establishment, embodied by the American Medical
Association, was in significant part responsible for the criminalization of
abortion.24 Preventing abortion was framed as a public health concern
during the move to professionalize medicine, as formally trained
physicians sought to establish standards for membership in and conduct of
the medical profession. 25 Here race and class are more clearly implicated,
because in much of the early history of the United States women's
reproductive health care was a domestic art performed by midwives, and
among the masses such care was frequently performed by poor, often
immigrant women, slaves, and later free black women. These women
practiced "healing arts" and folk cures.26 Black "grannies" or midwives
27
came under particular scrutiny by professional physicians. Black
midwives were often suspected of either performing abortions or
imparting to pregnant women information on how to perform them.28
Throughout the Americas, black women were sometimes accused of
providing "specifics," "herbs," or "powders" to women seeking to end a
pregnancy.2 9 Poor immigrant women were among the largest group of
23. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (an infamous and ultimately discredited case
supporting black slavery and articulating the non-citizenship of blacks whether slave or free) and Roe
are increasingly used by some contemporary anti-abortion politicians as part of a strategy to
delegitimize Roe by offering a new tool with which to attack its moral underpinnings. Thus
implemented, the two cases are sometimes shaped so as to appear "as a single line of villainy to be
overcome by Americans." CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC:
COMMUNICATING SOCIAL CHANGE 50 (1994). These politicians seek to establish a history in which
Dred Scott and Roe are "thematically linked and historically plotted." Id.
24. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 2, at 2035.
25. Id.
26. KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 16 (1985).
27. See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino, American Midif/ery Litigation and State Legislative Preferences
For Physician-Controlled Childbirth, II CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 61, 75 (2004).
28. GERTRUDE JACINTA FRASER, AFRICAN AMERICAN MIDWIFERY IN THE SOUTH: DIALOGUES
OF BIRTH, RACE, AND MEMORY 90 (1998).
29. DAVID BARRY GASPAR, MORE THAN CHATTEL: BLACK WOMEN AND SLAVERY IN THE
AMERICAS 205 (1996).
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abortion providers in some places.30 Immigrant women were most likely to
patronize immigrant midwives when seeking abortions.
Greenhouse and Siegel further point out in Part I of their Article that
twentieth-century advocates for liberalizing access to abortion also cited
health concerns, and that by the 1960s, Americans were debating abortion
as a problem concerning "poverty, population control, sexual freedom, and
women's equal citizenship."32 The authors term these "new ways" of
talking about abortion, apparently in contrast to medical discourses that
had previously dominated conversations on the issue. I would suggest
that such ways of talking about abortion in the 1960s were not new at all,
especially the first two. Poverty and population control had been at the
heart of programs created decades earlier by women's rights activists and
reformers such as Margaret Sanger. Sanger was a pivotal figure who
sought to increase women's control over reproduction both as a means of
enhancing their freedom and as a method of population control.3 4 Much of
her work was controversial, not only because Sanger promoted women's
access to birth control, but because of racial and class concerns raised by
her work. 5 Both in Sanger's time and in more contemporary accounts of
her work, some accused Sanger of advocating a program of eugenics to
reduce the number of poor people, immigrants, and blacks.3 6
30. See, e.g, LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1867-1973, at 71-73 (1998). Investigators of midwives in Chicago, New
York, Boston and Baltimore suspected that five percent to over fifty percent of midwives performed
illegal abortions. Id. at 71.
31. Id. at 73
32. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 2, at 2034-35.
33. Id.
34. See Loretta J. Ross, African-American Women and Abortion, in ABORTION WARS: A HALF
CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950-2000, at 161-62 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998).
35. Sanger was not directly associated with abortion advocacy and is said to have publicly
opposed it, though her private views were less clear. See TIANA NORGREN & CHRISTIANA A. E.
NORGREN, ABORTION BEFORE BIRTH CONTROL: THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION IN POSTWAR JAPAN
54 (2001). It is worth noting here that birth control and abortion were often considered parts of the
same conversation. Sanger herself acknowledged the relation between abortion and contraception in
suggesting that abortion, while undesireable in most circumstances, was an extreme form of birth
control, and should not be considered a "crime". MARGARET SANGER, WOMEN AND THE NEW RACE
63 (1923). Abortion, Sanger wrote, presented serious risks to women's health, especially to the health
of poorer women without access to skilled medical care or time for recovery after an abortion. Id. at
65. These risks could be avoided if women had access to contraception. Id. at 66-67.
36. Ross, supra note 34, at 171. According to Ross, Sanger came under the influence of nativist
whites who were at the center of the eugenics movement. As a result, Sanger changed her approach
from one that promoted the interests of all women to one that framed birth control as the privilege of
well-to-do women but the moral obligation of black and immigrant women. Id. While Sanger's
references to the "new race" in her work has sometimes been understood as evidence of her support for
the eugenics movement, others have argued that Sanger was referring to the improvement of the
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III. THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND REPUBLICAN
PARTY POLITICS
In Part II of their Article, the authors detail how, in order to woo
Catholic voters who were opposed to abortion, Republicans began to
oppose abortion despite the fact that they had been among the earliest
adherents of decriminalizing abortion. In doing so, the authors enter into
and help to enlarge an already established scholarly conversation on this
point. They note that the overarching goal of the Catholic Church was to
reverse the trend of liberalizing abortion laws. While part of the Catholic
strategy for opposing abortion was to frame opposition in more secular
terms, ultimately, anti-abortion activism remained closely tied to and even
became a central part of Catholic identity. Seizing on the Catholic
opposition to abortion, the Republican Party began to adopt anti-abortion
positions in order to attract Catholic voters. Greenhouse and Siegel cite the
work of Kevin Phillips, a Republican strategist who predicted the fall of
New Deal politics and who helped to widen the Republican coalition to
include Catholics who opposed abortion and Southerners who opposed
civil rights. 7 This latter point, I think, deserves additional discussion, as
here again the politics of race and class and the politics of abortion
converge and merge.
Kevin Phillips's work on the Republican "Southern strategy" is well
known.38 Much of this strategy focused on drawing mostly poor and
working class white Southerners who resented black civil rights gains.3 9
The Southern strategy and its race-based focus were not limited to the
South, however. 40 Much like Southerners, working-class Catholics in the
human species in general and not to a plan of racial debasement or extirpation. MARGARET SANGER,
WOMEN AND THE NEw RACE vii (1923).
37. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 2, at 2052.
38. KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY (1969). Here Phillips offers a
historical overview of United States electorcal history and urgers Republicans to forego Northern
voters in favor of Southerners. See George Packer, The New Liberalism, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 543, 546-47
(2009). Packer describes the "Southern strategy" as a means of dividing white Democrats in the South
from the rest of the party. Id. at 546. This included strategies such as nominating white Southerners for
the United States Supreme Court, thereby polarizing Democrats. Id. See also Michael Tonry, The
Social, Psychological, and Political Causes of Racial Disparities in the American Criminal Justice
System, 39 CRIME AND JUST. 273, 278-79 (2010). Tonry wrote "[t]he Republican Southern Strategy
was premised on an extraordinary non sequitur-that black/white differences in the South in the 1960s
were indistinguishable from ethnic differences at other times and places in American history." Id. at
278. Relying upon these differences, asserted Tonry, Kevin Phillips concluded that "manipulation of
racial passions would enable Republicans to achieve political dominance in the South and strengthen
their appeal to working-class whites elsewhere." Id. at 279.
39. PHILLIPS, supra note 38, at 23 26.
40. Packer suggests that calling such methods the Southern strategy was too narrow, as these
970 [VOL. 89:963
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North also resented what they perceived as black intrusion into their
neighborhoods, their schools, and their workplaces. 41 The Catholic
position on abortion was an issue that, while abundantly fueling the social
and political storm of the 1960s and 70s, must be read with the larger
concerns of race and class among Catholics in the South and in the urban
North.42
IV. CONCLUSION
In Part III of their Article, Greenhouse and Siegel illustrate the points
that they make earlier in their Article about the neglect of pre-Roe, non-
juristic explanations of the abortion conflict. They detail the varying
accounts frequently offered as to why the Court's decision in Roe had such
powerful effects on the nation's politics: Roe's nationalization of the
abortion conflict, Roe's divergence from popular opinion, and Roe's
prevention of compromise.43 At the foundation of all these accounts, the
authors assert, is the notion that bad judicial decision-making caused bad
politics. 44 The authors cite a number of legal, scholarly, and media
accounts that seem to adopt this premise. They go on to suggest that the
Court-centric narrative concerning judicial decision-making is not
sufficiently fact-based and thus does not adequately explain the politics of
abortion. The authors opine that the history of the abortion conflict before
Roe points up the need for a "deep history" assessment of abortion post-
Roe.45 This assessment would ostensibly entail a reading of the abortion
techiques were used "countrywide" and involved "Catholics in the North and ethnics in the city" as
well. George Packer, The New Liberalism, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 543, 547 (2009).
41. HARRY S. ASHMORE, CIVIL RIGHTS AND WRONGS: A MEMOIR OF RACE AND POLITICS,
1944-1996, at 245 (1997).
42. See, e.g., JOHN T. McGREEVY, PARISH BOUNDARIES: THE CATHOLIC ENCOUNTER WITH
RACE IN THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBAN NORTH 194-95 (1998).
43. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 2, at 2073-74.
44. Id. at 2074.
45. Id. at 2076. "Deep history" generally refers to a domain of inquiry that extends into human
prehistory, thousands or even millions of years into the past. Deep history is in contrast to standard
scholarly methodological approaches to history that address human history from relatively recent times
beginning in the 1700s. Andrew Shyrock & Daniel Lord Small, Introduction, in DEEP HISTORY: THE
ARCHITECTURE OF PAST AND PRESENT, at 11-12 (Andrew Shyrock and Daniel Lord Small eds., 2011).
The term deep history has, however, been adopted across disciplines by scholars in various fields who
"fret about chronological constraints and issue calls for 'evolutionary politcs,' 'evolutionary
economics,' or evolutionary studies of the law." Id. at 12. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, Western Legal
Imperialism: Thinking about the Deep Historical Roots, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 305,
309 20 (2009) (arguing that the rise of Western law and its institutional tendency to spread is not a
contemporary phenomenon but instead began in antiquity). In calling for a deep history Greenhouse
and Siegel employ the phrase only in its most general sense of seeking answers beyond the immediate
reach of the legal history of abortion.
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controversy that recognizes that the Court is not necessarily or at all the
source of the controversy.
I am well in accord with the authors on the need to engage in a more
archaeological assessment of Roe. To date much scholarly attention has
been focused on the legal configuration of Roe and on assumptions about
its normative role in creating and shaping the politics of abortion.
Greenhouse and Siegel sound a clarion call to scholars for a more integral
analysis of the social, cultural, and political history of the abortion debate.
I would add, however, that it is crucial to recognize the United States
abortion debate as a consequential discursive skein in the "politics of
emotion," a politics that, in some instances, has replaced overt racist or
classist appeals with moral and religious judgmentalism via abortion.4 6
Hence, a fuller history of the abortion debate must encompass by necessity
other factors, especially race and class, in order to offer a complete
picture.
46. GLENN FELDMAN, POLITICS AND RELIGION IN THE WHITE SOUTH 5 (2005). Feldman
discusses the way in which anti-black racism was in some instances replaced by anti-abortion rhetoric
as a shibboleth of social and political conservatism. Feldman writes, for instance, that in one religious
denomination, the "sin" of endorsing abortion rights replaced endorsing integration, but that factions
within the group who contended over these issues were comprised essentially of the same people. Id
at 101.
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